As
I have mentioned in a previous article, there is
very little difference among the Isaaq secessionists
between the man in the street and those presumably
educated ones when it comes to articulating their
grievances and their justifications for their secession.
More often than not, they tend to over-dramatize
and exaggerate their suffering under the regime
of Siyad Barre, and to hurl gratuitous insults and
emotional tirades against all and sundry.
A
good example are recent articles in Awdalnews by
Yussuf Dirir Ali (A band-aid for bleeding hearts)
and an earlier one by Abdulkadir Idan (Game is over
for Somaliland’s enemies). Perhaps annoyed by recent
unfavourable articles in Awdalbews and Wardheernews
websites, possibly including some of mine, these
writers inveigh against what they call the “Faqash”-
the derogatory sobriquet for the rest of the people
in Somalia- who are collectively considered as collaborators
of the former Siyad Barre regime. While their strong
feelings concerning the crimes committed by the
former military regime against the Isaaqs are understandable,
it is another thing to vent their bitterness in
an abusive manner on the rest of the Somali people,
who themselves had suffered under that regime in
one way or another.
No
one is disputing the fact that the former military
regime has committed heinous crimes against the
Isaaq clan as it also did, to varying degrees, against
other clans, individuals and groups. But when it
comes to roughly how many Isaaqs were killed by
the regime, it is any body’s guess. The writers
in Awdalnews claim that the atrocities committed
against them are comparable to the genocide of the
Tutsi in Rwanda (close to one million killed) or
the Jewish Holocaust during the Nazi era (nearly
6 million killed). This is simply going over the
top, given the paucity of facts and figures. To
indulge in such ridiculous comparisons for propaganda
purposes is to merely shoot yourself on the foot.
It is self defeating since it is bound to discredit
their version of the history of the excesses of
the former military regime.
How
come that during all the 14 years of so-called independence
of Somaliland, it has not been deemed necessary
by the self-styled government to solicit help from
the international community so that through professional
investigation could be carried out as was the case
in other war-torn countries such as Cambodian, Rwanda
and the Balkans?. That this has not been undertaken
can only be the result of a deliberate policy at
the highest level that prefers to make capital out
of the alleged genocide rather than digging up the
facts once and for all. The longer this is not done,
the stronger the doubts about the scale of the alleged
genocide and the greater the suspicion that this
tragedy has been cynically exploited to further
the secessionist propaganda for independence.
The
next question is why do the secessionists needlessly
alienate the rest of the Somali people and negate
all the groundswell of good will generated by the
atrocities of the former regime? I have argued in
my previous article (Somaliland recognition: why
it won’t happen) that the Isaaq antipathy towards
others, in particular Southerners, has political
roots. Their disenchantment with the union was not
prompted solely by the excesses of the Siyad Barre
regime but rather goes back to the early days soon
after independence when increasing numbers of the
Isaaq clan began agitating covertly or overtly for
secession, culminating in the 1962 military insurrection
in the North. The period between 1960 and 1969 was
a time when Somalia had democratic governments and
indeed Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the last Prime
Minister overthrown in 1969 by Siyad Barre, was
their own man. Undoubtedly, one contributing factor
to the Isaaq grievances right from the start was
the highly centralized nature of the government
where most administrative matters were handled in
Mogadishu with all its admittedly irritating inconveniences.
But this was not unique to the North. All other
regions faced the same problems. The overriding
reason for the secessionist sentiments, then as
now, is that the Isaaqs realised soon after union
that they were only one clan among equals in Somalia
and no longer the dominant clan they used to be
in the by-gone days of former British Somaliland.
It is a craving for this glorious past that is driving
their secessionist crusade to return to their former
status as a separate independent country where Hargeisa
is once again the capital and the Isaaqs are once
more the dominant clan. All the economic, social
and political advantages they would enjoy under
a federal, democratic Somalia, in which they have
their own regional assemblies, has no appeal for
them. It is Somaliland where they are the top dog
or nothing else. The suffering under Siyad Barre
has merely reinforced these long simmering secessionist
sentiments.
The
Isaaq secessionist strategy rests on a number of
planks: Firstly, it is to drive as big a wedge as
possible between them and the South and render the
N.W and the rest of Somalia as two separate unrelated
countries for all practical purposes. Even if no
country has recognized them, they have at least
the initial satisfaction that they had managed to
force UNDP Somalia, and other UN and aid agencies
based in Hargeisa, to treat them as de facto independent
country to the extent that Hargeisa can veto any
relief or development assistance to regions in the
North-West that refuse to subscribe to the secession
such as Sool, Eastern Sanaag and Cayn. As part of
this de-linking from Somalia, Southerners are considered
as foreigners and are liable to deportation if they
set foot in Hargeisa. This deliberate hostility
towards other Somalis is not as random and disconnected
as it might appear. Indeed, they are part of the
strategy to make themselves so unpopular with the
South that the later will in the end throw the towel
and succumb to the dictates of the secessionists:
The
second blank is to miss no opportunity to indirectly
fan the flames of the mayhem and disorder in Mogadishu.
The daily diatribe against President Abdullahi Yussuf
is aimed at stoking up the old distrust between
Hawiya and Darood. This comes as a big propaganda
boost to the warlords who are further motivated
to derail the nascent government formed in Nairobi
and to thwart the emergence of any other
government any time in the foreseeable future. The
longer the South is in turmoil, the longer the warlords
can prevail and hence the less likely a government
will emerge. This is all in line with the wishes
of the secessionists. There is thus a convergence
of interest between the warlords and the secessionists.
Neither side wants peace and stability in the South
or the emergence of a government. If that situation
were to persist and the international community
were to give up on Somalia in the end, and say enough
is enough, the recognition of Somaliland cannot
be completely ruled out provided it is in full control
of the N.W and that it has the support of all the
clans and regions of former British Somaliland–an
impossible condition to fulfil as I will argue below.
Speaking
as one from the N.W, admittedly non-Isaaq, how do
we fit into the Isaaq designs? Their attitude towards
the rest of us in the N.W is at best volatile and
can change like traffic lights. When they are at
their most ebullient mood, you have the green light
and can expect on such occasions to be embraced
comradely as a fellow Somalilander and be reminded,
lest you forget at your peril, of the unshakable
bonds between the people of Somaliland. This is
when they are politically motivated since the Isaaqs
need other clans to join them if they have to convince
the outside world that it is not only them, the
Isaaqs, but the whole population and clans of former
British Somaliland who had together opted for secession.
When, on the other hand, they are in a bad mood
or doubts arise about the loyalties of non-Isaaqs
to the secessionist, you are reminded in no uncertain
terms of who you are after all – a despised Faqash!!!
The
ability of the non-Isaaq clans to resist the unwelcome
embraces of the secessionists differs, depending
on their geographical location. The Gadabuursi and
Issa clans are in a more vulnerable situation and
had little choice but to succumb to the SNM occupation-
at least for now. Lest they forget, they are constantly
reminded of their past sins as collaborators of
Siyad Barre, a crime for which they have to atone
by showing unwavering loyalty to the secession.
No one is more subject to these accusations as the
president who is originally from Borama. A Damocles
sword is constantly hanging over his head, as his
Isaaq tormenters endlessly accuse him of contrived
war crimes when he was an official of the regime
of Siyad Barre- as did the above-mentioned writers.
The
Eastern Regions of Sool, Eastern Sanaag and Cayn
are in a better geographical position as they are
contiguous with the rest of Somalia. They had managed
to ward off the secessionists and remain part and
parcel of Somalia. It has not been lost upon the
secessionists of the importance of being seen by
the outside world to be in full control of the whole
N.W. This need was the rationale for their desperate
attempt last year to capture Lascanod, the capital
of the Sool region. Fortunately they were repulsed,
thanks to the defending Puntland forces. But even
if they were to overrun Lasanod, and that is a big
if, that is not tantamount to controlling the region
and having the support of the people everywhere.
The chances of capturing these Harti regions in
the N.W will get slimmer as the new government of
Somalia extends its writ to the region and to everywhere
else in Somalia. As long as the defiance of the
Harti areas in the N.W persists- and there is no
reason why it should falter or change- the chances
of Somaliland’s recognition are almost nil.
As
a patriotic Somalian, nothing offends me more than
to be called a Somalilander. Call me Faqash anytime!!!
By
Mohsin Mahad
Mohsinmahad@yahoo.co.uk
Somaliland
Recognition: Why it won’t happen
